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Abstract
This paper incorporates the phenomenon of time inconsistency into the
problem of designing an optimal transfer schedule. It is shown that if program
beneciaries are time inconsistent and receive all of the resources in just one
payment, then the equilibrium allocation is always inecient. In the spirit of
the second welfare theorem, we show that any ecient allocation can be ob-
tained in equilibrium when the policymaker has full information. This assump-
tion is relaxed by introducing uncertainty and asymmetric information into the
model. The optimal solution reects the dilemma that a policymaker has to
face when playing the roles of commitment enforcer and insurance provider
simultaneously.
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1 Introduction
Public transfers constitute a very important policy tool in developed and develop-
ing societies alike. From anti-poverty programs to unemployment insurance benets,
they play a very important role as a welfare enhancing mechanism.
Mainstream public economics analyzes the problem of designing an optimal trans-
fer schedule based on the assumption that individuals have an abundance of psycho-
logical resources: unboundedly rational, forward looking, and internally consistent.1
Particularly, it is assumed that individuals are unbounded in their self-control and
optimally follow whatever plans they set out for themselves. In this paper, we in-
vestigate the optimal design of a transfer schedule when individuals have self-control
problems.
Economic theories of intertemporal choice generally assume that individuals dis-
count the future exponentially. In other words, the choices made between today and
tomorrow should be no dierent from the choices made between the days 200 and 201
from now, all else equal. However, experimental evidence suggests that many indi-
viduals have preferences that reverse as the date of decision making nears. Research
on animal and human behavior has led scientists to conclude that preferences are
roughly hyperbolic in shape, implying a high discount rate in the immediate future,
and relatively lower rate over periods that are further away (Ainslie 1992; Lowenstein
and Thaler 1989). Moreover, there exists eld evidence of present-biased preferences
and time inconsistent behavior (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2003; Fang and Silver-
man 2004). Angeletos et al (2001) calibrate the hyperbolic and exponential models
using US data on savings and consumption, nding that the former model better
matches actual consumers' behavior. They noticed that, in contrast to the expo-
1An example of such approach applied in a dynamic setting is the article on unemployment
insurance written by Shavell and Weiss (1979). They characterize the time sequence of benets that
maximizes the expected utility of the unemployed. Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) study second
best allocations in a static model where government lacks full information about consumer types.
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nential discounting model, hyperbolic households exhibit a high level of comovement
between predictable changes in income and changes in consumption. This type of be-
havior has also been found in empirical studies that show how consumption is often
very sensitive to an income transfer in the very short-run.2 Similar results have been
found in developing countries, particularly the development of commitment devices
to face the time inconsistency problem (Rutheford 1999; Ashraf, Gons, Karlan, and
Yin 2003; Ashraf, Gons, Karlan, and Yin 2006).
In this paper we present a very simple model that captures this phenomenon
within the context of designing an optimal transfer schedule. We refer to this type of
policy tool as a consumption maintenance program (CMP). The dynamic economic
environment we study has two actors: a policymaker whose goal is to allocate an
exogenous budget in order to maximize some welfare function, and an agent who
takes consumption-savings decisions over time and is borrowing constrained. The
policymaker is fully committed to his plan once it is established. In contrast, the
beneciary may be time-inconsistent and may not follow up his original consumption
plan in the future.
Following a tradition in public economics, we begin the analysis with a rst-best
approach. We show that if program beneciaries are time inconsistent and receive
all the benets in just one payment, then the equilibrium consumption allocation is
always inecient. In other words, it could be possible, in principle, to strictly increase
the beneciary's welfare at some point in time, without decreasing his welfare in other
time periods. On the other hand, if the policymaker has total exibility in the way he
can allocate the public budget over time and can impose negative lump-sum transfers,
2Stephens (2003) and Stephens (2002) study the consumption response to monthly paycheck
receipt in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. Under the standard life-
cycle/permanent income hypothesis, household consumption should not respond to paycheck arrival.
Nevertheless, he nds an excessive response to paycheck receipt. In the case of the US, he shows how
the sensitivity is higher for households for which Social Security represents an important proportion
of their total income. In a similar study and using data on the consumption patterns of food stamp
recipients in the US, Shapiro (2005) presents evidence of declining caloric intake over the 30-day
period following the receipt of food stamps.
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any ecient consumption allocation can be obtained in equilibrium. Intuitively, the
CMP is used as a commitment mechanism by the policymaker in order to impose
time consistency for some previously chosen ecient consumption plan. We also
characterize the set of feasible consumption allocations when lump-sum transfers are
non-negative and the beneciary has access to an exogenous and deterministic income
ow. Therefore, we can nd an analogy between the CMP and Laibson's golden
eggs model (Laibson 1997a), where the commitment technology takes the form of an
illiquid asset.
In a more realistic scenario, the assumption that the beneciary's relevant in-
formation is public seems to be too strong. Income often cannot be observed by the
policymaker, especially in developing countries where the informal sector is pervasive.
Moreover, fully committing to some transfer schedule is not the best policy ex-ante in
an uncertain environment. Therefore, not only the policymaker should consider his
role as a commitment "enforcer", but also as an insurer that helps beneciaries face
the potential risk of receiving a negative income shock. We introduce this concern
into our model by assuming that while the policymaker can observe the distribution of
income shocks, he cannot observe their actual realizations. We approach this problem
from a mechanism design perspective. The solution we found represents the existent
tradeo between a more committed versus a more exible transfer schedule.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple dynamic model
with quasi-hyperbolic discounting into the problem of designing a transfer schedule.
Section 3 studies the problem from a rst-best perspective, assuming the policymaker
has full information and lump-sum transfers are feasible. Section 4 characterizes the
optimal transfer schedule when the policy maker only knows the distribution of income
shocks. Section 5 concludes. Most of the mathematical details are in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
Consider the following economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1; 2; : : : ; T .
There is one agent who lives for T  3 periods and one policymaker or planner. There
is one consumption good x. The instantaneous utility function u : R+ ! R of the
agent is assumed to satisfy the following conditions: u() is C2 over (0;1), u0(x) > 0,
and u00(x) < 0.
In period t, preferences over consumption streams x = (x1; : : : ; xT ) 2 R
T
+ are
representable by the utility function
Ut(x) = u(xt) + 
PT
ﬁ=t+1 
ﬁ tu(xﬁ )
where (; ) 2 (0; 1]  (0; 1]. There exists a linear storage technology with gross
return R > 0. The agent is liquidity constrained in the sense that he can save but
not borrow.
The type of preferences represented by this model incorporates the so-called quasi-
geometric discounting3. The parameter  is called the standard discount factor and
it represents the long-run, time consistent discounting; the parameter  represents
a preference for immediate gratication and is known as the present-biased factor.
For  = 1 these preferences reduce to exponential discounting. For  < 1, the (; )
formulation implies discount rates that decline as the discounted event is moved
further away in time.4
In the present analysis, we assume that the agent is sophisticated in the sense that
she is fully aware of her time inconsistency problem. When preferences are dynami-
cally inconsistent, it is standard practice to formally model the agent as a sequence
of temporal selves making choices in a dynamic game. Similar to Strotz (1956), Peleg
and Yaari (1973), Goldman (1980), Laibson (1997b), Laibson (1998), O'Donoghue
3This type of preferences was originally proposed by Phelps and Pollack (1968).
4See Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002), for review of the (; ) formulation and its
relation to hyperbolic discounting.
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and Rabin (2001), and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1993), we model this problem by
thinking of the agent as consisting of T autonomous selves whose intertemporal util-
ity functions are given by
U1 = u(x1) + u(x2) + 
2u(x3) + : : :+ 
T 2u(xT 1) + 
T 1u(xT )
U2 = u(x2) + u(x3) + 
2u(x4) + : : :+ 
T 3u(xT 1) + 
T 2u(xT )
U3 = u(x3) + u(x4) + 
2u(x5) + : : :+ 
T 4u(xT 1) + 
T 3u(xT )
... =
...
Ut = u(xt) + u(xt+1) + : : :+ 
T tu(xT )]
... =
...
UT = u(xT )
The government implements a consumption maintenance programme (CMP here-
after), which consists of allocating an exogenous budget B > 0 to the individual
through a transfer schedule fﬁtg
T
t=1. The government allocates this budget over time
in order to maximize the "long-run" welfare of the agent represented by the function5
W (x1; : : : ; xt) =
TX
t=1
t 1u(xt) (1)
5Three main approaches to evaluate welfare when preferences are time inconsistent can be found
in the literature. The rst approach, extensively applied in the consumption-savings literature by
Goldman (1979) and Phelps and Pollak (1968), emphasizes the application of a Pareto criterion to
evaluate equilibrium allocations. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) advocate maximizing welfare from
a "long-run perspective". It involves the existence of a "...(ctitious) period 0 where the person has
no decision to make and weights all future periods equally." This approach incorporates the fact that
most models of present-biased preferences try to capture situations in which people pursue immediate
gratication. Moreover, they consider the Pareto criterion as "too strong" because it often refuses
strategies that are preferred by almost all incarnations of the agent. In that sense, ranking strategies
becomes complicated since "...the Pareto criterion often refuses to rank two strategies even when one
is much preferred by virtually all period selves, while the other is preferred by only one period self."
Finally, there is a third approach that privileges a subset C 2 2T of players. For instance, welfare may
be evaluated with respect to current self's perspective. This "dictatorship of the present" approach
has been applied by Cropper and Laibson (1998), and Cropper and Koszegi (2001), where the goal
of the policy maker at time t is to maximize the welfare of self-t.
5
Intuitively, this welfare function represents the policymaker's preference for smoother
consumption paths.6 Following a tradition in the income maintenance program liter-
ature, we set aside the revenue-raising implications to nance this budget. We have
in mind a world in which the budget B is nanced by the non-target population or
by some other exogenous source of funding. For the purposes of the present study, we
abstract from the process of identifying the target population, focusing exclusively
on the allocation of benets.
3 First-Best Consumption Maintenance Programs
In this section, we establish a benchmark case by characterizing the optimal CMP
when the beneciary's income ow fytg
T
t=1 can be observed by and lump-sum transfers
are feasible to the policymaker. Formally, the set of feasible transfer schedules is given
by
BF = f(ﬁ1; : : : ; ﬁT ) 2 R
T :
PT
t=1R
1 tﬁt = Bg
In contrast to a time-inconsistent beneciary, we assume that once the policymaker
decides which transfer schedule will be implemented, he is fully committed to that
program. We can formally model this problem as a two-stage game where the players
are the policymaker and the T dierent incarnations of the agent. In stage 1, the
policymaker announces the transfer schedule to be implemented. In stage 2, the
dierent incarnations of the agent play a consumption-savings game.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we introduce some useful concepts and def-
initions as well as the equilibrium concept we will employ in this section. Let !t be
cash on hand. This variable evolves according to
6This type of analysis, where the policymaker has an objective function that is dierent from that
of the agent, is not new in public economics. As noticed by Kanbur, Pirttila, and Tuomala (2004)
"...there is a long tradition of non-welfarist welfare economics...where the outcomes of individual be-
havior are evaluated using a preference function dierent from the one that generate the outcomes."
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!t+1 = R(!t   xt) + yt+1 + ﬁt+1
with !1 = ﬁ1 + y1. In the present study, we will focus on consumption strategies in
which the past inuences current play only through its eect on cash on hand, so
the equilibrium concept for the consumption-savings game is that of Markov perfect
equilibrium. A feasible consumption strategy for player t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg is given by the
function st : !t ! [0; !t].
7 We say that an equilibrium allocation x(ﬁ) is induced by
a transfer schedule ﬁ 2 BF if it is supported by some Markov perfect equilibrium of
the consumption-savings game. A rst-best CMP is derived from the solution to the
two-stage game described above:
Denition 1 ﬁ  = (ﬁ 1 ; : : : ; ﬁ

T ) 2 B
F is a rst-best CMP if W (x(ﬁ ))  W (x(ﬁ)) for
every ﬁ 2 BF , where x(ﬁ ) 2 RT+ and x(ﬁ) 2 R
T
+ are equilibrium allocations induced,
respectively, by the transfer schedules ﬁ  and ﬁ .
3.1 Transfer Schedules without Commitment: The One-Payment
CMP
In this section, we study the behavioral implications and welfare outcomes of one-
payment CMP. We assume that the policy maker is constrained to transfer all of the
resources in period 1, where by all resources we mean the public budget B plus the
present value of the beneciary's future income ow.8 In some circumstances, this is
equivalent to giving access to capital markets to the beneciary, so he would be able
to borrow money against his future income stream. Besides being a benchmark case
for comparisons, this seems to be the natural setup for the analysis: administrative
costs, technological constraints, and other types of impediments may prevent the
policymaker from distributing the budget with more exibility.
7More formally, we could denote by St the set of all feasible strategies for player t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; Tg
and by S1  S2 : : : ST the joint strategy space of all players.
8This implicitly implies that negative transfers can be implemented. We will weaken this as-
sumption later on.
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One implication of assuming that the beneciary is time consistent ( = 1) is
that the optimal consumption path from self 1's perspective can be implemented in
equilibrium: his future incarnations will consume and save the amounts he wants
them to. Moreover, because the beneciary and the policy maker share the same
intertemporal preferences, an optimal CMP is to transfer the total budget in period
1. On the other hand, if the individual is time inconsistent ( < 1), this may not
be an ecient policy because, as we will see below, it could be possible for the
policymaker to weakly improve the welfare of the beneciary in all periods, and to
strictly increase his welfare at some period. The strategic interaction of his dierent
incarnations might generate a coordination failure with a suboptimal outcome as a
result.
In the present setting, it can be shown that for all  < 1 the equilibrium allocation
x 2 RT++ is inecient from a long-run perspective: we can always nd a period
t < T such that reallocating consumption from t to some j > t implies a welfare
improvement. In other words, by transferring consumption from period t to period j,
not only could it be possible to increase the welfare of self t, but also the welfare of
their past and future incarnations.9 Notice that if the agent were time consistent, this
behavior should not be observed in equilibrium. Having time inconsistent preferences
is what opens the possibility of an inecient equilibrium.10
Proposition 2.1 establishes that, for the one-payment CMP, if the beneciary is
time inconsistent, then the equilibrium allocation is inecient11
9Therefore, this result also implies that the consumption allocation is not Pareto optimal.
10In the context of a consumption-savings problem, Laibson(1996) shows how damaging in terms
of welfare the type of behavior implied by quasi-hyperbolic discounting could be when the agent
has a constant relative risk aversion utility function. Based on his own calibration, he argues that
inadequate access to optimal savings policies translates in a welfare cost of at least 9
10
of one year
income. He discusses the positive eects of some policies to increase not only savings but also the
welfare of each of the dierent selves when the agent faces a time inconsistency problem.
11Although there has been some progress in the characterization of equilibria with quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, the analysis of the welfare properties of those equilibria has been limited to the case of
constant relative risk aversion. Intuitively, it is clear that the inecient property of the equilibrium
of the game should not be a consequence of assuming CRRA preferences. Under very general
conditions, Goldman (1979) shows that an interior equilibrium consumption allocation is ecient if
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Proposition 1 In the one-payment CMP with a time-inconsistent beneciary, the
consumption allocation, x(ﬁ) 2 RT++, arising in equilibrium is inecient.
PROOF: See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is very simple: if the policymaker transfers all of
the resources in just one payment, a time-inconsistent beneciary will nd himself
in a situation of overconsumption. In particular, it can be shown that self T-2 will
always be overconsuming in the sense that it would be possible to increase his welfare
by transferring resources to the future. Since preferences are separable and monotone,
the equilibrium allocation is also inecient from a long-run perspective.
Interestingly, this result may sound counterintuitive for those who consider that
providing more liquidity to the poor is always the best policy. Our conjecture is
that a nal answer much depends on the specic goals of a CMP. For instance, if
the primary goal of a CMP is to smooth consumption over time, then a one-payment
CMP may not be an optimal policy if the beneciary is time inconsistent, other things
constant. On the other hand, if the objective of the policymaker is to help beneciaries
to better face some form of risk such as income shocks, then transferring nancial
support in as few payments as possible seems to be a better policy, particularly if
insurance markets do not work eciently. This type of dilemmas will be analyzed
more formally in section 4 where we create a second-best environment in which the
policymaker must face potential tradeos implied by more committed, though less
exible, transfer schedules.
and only if it is best for the rst generation (self 1 in the current setting). Therefore, our result is
a kind of corollary to the main proposition in Goldman's paper. More precisely, the stronger result
we have obtained is a direct consequence of assuming intertemporal separability as well as concavity
and dierentiability of the instantaneous utility function.
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3.2 Reestablishing Eciency through Transfer Schemes
In the present setting, we have shown that any equilibrium allocation is inecient
when the policymaker transfers all of the resources in just one payment. In a rst-best
scenario where the policymaker has full information, it seems reasonable to expect
that the best allocation from a long-run perspective can be obtained in equilibrium.12
In fact, we will show that it is possible for the policymaker to implement any Pareto
ecient allocation x 2 RT+ by doling out transfers such that cash on hand is equal to
the optimal consumption path: i.e. !t = ﬁt+yt = x

t , for all t. Lemma 2.1 establishes
this result more formally:
Lemma 1 If the policymaker has full information and there is total exibility in the
way transfers can be allocated over time, then any ecient consumption allocation
can be obtained in equilibrium. Moreover, there exists a unique perfect equilibrium
supporting this allocation.
PROOF: See Appendix.
We prove this proposition by applying the following line of logic. First, notice
that for any ecient allocation x 2 RT++ the beneciary is not overconsuming at any
time period. Second, since he is not overconsuming, he has no incentive to transfer
resources to the future even if he actually could choose the point in time at which these
resources will be consumed. From here we obtain the result that the ecient allocation
arises as the equilibrium allocation. Intuitively, the policymaker provides, through
the lump-sum transfer scheme, a mechanism that makes the beneciary commit to
follow up an optimal consumption path.13
Since the best allocation from a long-run perspective is ecient, the following
result is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.1:
12Notice that the best allocation from a long-run perspective corresponds to the allocation that
would be chosen by the beneciary if he were time consistent.
13As a corollary to this Proposition, notice that it is always possible for the policy maker to
implement a CMP that Pareto dominates the one-payment CMP.
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Proposition 2 In a rst-best setting where negative transfers can be implemented,
the best allocation from a long-run perspective can be obtained in equilibrium.
In a more realistic scenario, lump-sum transfers should be restricted to be non-
negative. Most consumption maintenance programs do not impose any type of neg-
ative income transfer to their beneciaries. We formally incorporate this feature by
dening a new set BF+ of feasible transfers:
BF+ = f(ﬁ1; : : : ; ﬁT ) 2 R
T :
PT
t=1R
1 tﬁt  B; ﬁt  0 8tg
The following corollary is a simple extension of Proposition 2 to the case with non-
negative transfers.14
Corollary 1 Given an ecient consumption prole x 2 RT+, if yt  x

t 8t, then x

can be implemented with non-negative transfers.
Intuitively, the larger the budget B is with respect to the present value of the ben-
eciary's income ow
PT
t=1R
1 tyt, the more control the policymaker has over the
ow of post-transfer income
PT
t=1R
1 t(yt + ﬁt). In consequence, the set of ecient
consumption schedules that can be implemented expands as B gets larger.
4 Second-Best Consumption Maintenance Programs
The assumption that the policymaker has full information with respect to the
beneciary's income sequence, though helpful to establish a benchmark case to com-
pare with, is clearly not representative of a more realistic CMP design. Incomes are
far from being perfectly observable, especially in developing countries. Moreover, the
assumption that the income process is deterministic does not seem to be a reasonable
one since the poor are likely to face a highly uncertain economic environment. In
14This result is very easily obtained as an extension of Proposition 2 by setting !t = x

t
for
all t. Since yt  x

t
, the policymaker sets ﬁt = x

t
  yt for all t. This is a feasible choice sinceP
t
R1 t(x
t
  yt) =
P
t
R1 tﬁt = B
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this context, an optimal CMP should consider the existent tradeo between bringing
commitment to the beneciary with self-control problems and providing an insur-
ance mechanism that help him overcome the ups and downs of everyday life. In
other words, an optimal CMP should oer a package balancing both insurance and
commitment motives.
We introduce uncertainty into the model by assuming that income is indepen-
dently and identically distributed over time with probability distribution
yt =
8><
>:
yL with probability 
yH with probability 1  
where yH > yL. We say that the beneciary receives a negative income shock at time
t if yt = yL. Analogously, we say the beneciary receives a positive income shock at
time t if yt = yH . For tractability and to keep the analysis as simple as possible we
assume that the instantaneous utility function is exponential u(xt) =   exp( xt).
Let Et be the expectation operator conditional on all information available at t, and
let E( u(yt)) =  <1
It is assumed that, while the policymaker knows the distribution of income shocks,
income realizations are not public information. Therefore, the ecient allocation of
resources is impeded by the problem of incentive compatibility: if reporting a negative
income shock in period t implies the reception of a higher transfer, then it is very
likely that the beneciary has an incentive to misreport his current income shock
when it is positive.
Based on the revelation principle, the policymaker can restrict attention to direct
revelation mechanisms with the property that the beneciary truthfully reports her
true income yt.
For any period t, let ﬁi represent the transfer at time t when the beneciary reports
income shock i 2 fH;Lg, and let ﬁ 0i be the corresponding budget left at t + 1. In
12
period T   1, the policymaker solves the problem
max
ﬁL;ﬁH ;ﬁ
0
L
;ﬁ 0
H
[u(ﬁL + yL) + ET 1u(ﬁ
0
L + yT )] + (1  )[u(ﬁH + yH) + ET 1u(ﬁ
0
H + yT )]
subject to the following incentive-compatibility and resource constraints
u(ﬁL + yL) + ET 1u(ﬁ
0
L + yT )  u(ﬁH + yL) + ET 1u(ﬁ
0
H + yT ) (2)
u(ﬁH + yH) + ET 1u(ﬁ
0
H + yT )  u(ﬁL + yH) + ET 1u(ﬁ
0
L + yT ) (3)
ﬁL +R
 1ﬁ 0L  BT 1 (4)
ﬁH +R
 1ﬁ 0H  BT 1 (5)
where BT 1 is the budget left at time T   1. Dene by vT 1(BT 1) the value func-
tion of this problem. By standard arguments, vT 1(BT 1) is strictly concave and
dierentiable.
Next, take any period t and suppose vt+1(Bt) is strictly concave and dierentiable.
Although the policymaker and the beneciary disagree on the amount of discounting
applied between t and t + 1, they both agree on the utility obtained from t + 1 on.
By applying a standard induction argument, we have that for all t the planner solves
the problem:
max
ﬁL;ﬁH ;ﬁ
0
L
;ﬁ 0
H
[u(ﬁL + yL) + vt+1(ﬁ
0
L)] + (1  )[u(ﬁH + yH) + vt+1(ﬁ
0
H)]
subject to the following incentive compatible and budget constraints:
u(ﬁL + yL) + vt+1(ﬁ
0
L)  u(ﬁH + yL) + vt+1(ﬁ
0
H) (6)
u(ﬁH + yH) + vt+1(ﬁ
0
H)  u(ﬁL + yH) + vt+1(ﬁ
0
L) (7)
ﬁL +R
 1ﬁ 0L  Bt (8)
ﬁH +R
 1ﬁ 0H  Bt (9)
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In what follows, we will characterize the equilibrium arising in the current setting.
First, we introduce the following result that states that when the beneciary receives
a "negative" income shock he must be transferred at least the same amount than in
the case where he receives a "positive" income shock in order to have an incentive-
compatible equilibrium.
Lemma 2 ﬁL  ﬁH in equilibrium.
PROOF: See Appendix.
The policymaker faces a tradeo: on the one hand, he must take into account the
fact that the beneciary has a self-control problem, implying that he has an incentive
to report yL when he actually received a positive income shock. On the other hand,
the policymaker plays the role of an insurer who should provide a higher transfer
when the agent receives a negative income shock. In other words, the policymaker
considers both benets and costs of implementing a more "committed", though less
exible, CMP.
It was argued above that the self control problem can be parameterized by : the
lower this parameter, the stronger the preference for immediate gratication. In his
role of insurer, the policymaker should consider some measure of risk that considers
somehow the dispersion of income shocks. We dene the following measure of risk:
 =  u(yH   yL) = exp( (yH   yL))
This measure integrates a constant  > 0, a measure of the degree or risk aversion of
the beneciary, and a measure of the dispersion of the income shock yH   yL. This
measure is based on the idea that a beneciary's sense of well being depends on the
risk he faces. We have the following result
Proposition 3 If income shocks are unobservable, then the optimal CMP is designed
as follows
i) If    : ﬁH = ﬁL (pooling equilibrium).
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ii) If  >  : ﬁH < ﬁL (separating equilibrium).
PROOF: See Appendix.
Proposition 2.3 establishes that if the beneciary's self-control problem (parame-
terized by ) is relatively more serious than the vulnerability problem he faces (pa-
rameterized by  ), then the policymaker optimally opts for a pooling equilibrium
where he transfers ﬁ  independently of the value that the income shock takes, where
ﬁ  satises u0(ﬁ ) = v0t+1(Bt   ﬁ
).
Income reports are a mechanism to extract private information that may be helpful
for the design of a more ecient transfer schedule in the presence of risk. Speci-
cally, having information on actual realizations of income shocks makes consumption
smoothing an easier task for the policymaker. However, if the degree of self control
is too low, the policy maker's optimal response is to oer a non-contingent transfer
schedule. This is equivalent to commit to a transfer schedule at period 0, before the
consumption-savings game starts. Therefore, the value of information is zero for low
levels of self-control.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the problem of designing an optimal transfer schedule when
the beneciary is a dynamically-inconsistent decision maker. When he has total con-
trol over the resources from the beginning of the period under consideration, the
outcome is generally inecient. This questions the traditional view that providing
more liquidity to the poor and making capital markets work more eciently are su-
cient conditions to generate ecient outcomes. In a world with imperfect individuals,
perfect markets may not generate the best possible equilibrium.
If the policymaker has full information and lump-sum transfers are not restricted
to be non-negative, then any ecient consumption allocation can be obtained in
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equilibrium. By imposing constraints on future cash-on-hand, the policymaker is
able to inuence the pattern of expenditure in future periods and, in consequence, to
reestablish eciency. Obviously, the set of ecient allocations that can be obtained
in equilibrium is more restricted when lump-sum transfers cannot be negative: the
policymaker has less inuence on the nal arrangement of the income ow. However,
for many, if not most, CMP the budget B represents an important proportion of
the total amount of resources available to the the beneciary. This fact provides the
policymaker with more degrees of freedom for reallocating resources and obtaining
more ecient outcomes by means of exercising more control over the beneciary's
income ow. In this sense, a transfer schedule is a kind of commitment mechanism.
One potential drawback of this rst-best approach is that, although helpful to
establish a benchmark case, it does not provide an accurate description of the cir-
cumstances that a policymaker usually has to face when allocating benets to the
poor or the unemployed. Information is far from being public, and many characteris-
tics of the beneciary, particularly income, are hidden information. Another problem
is that a reasonable goal of a CMP is to help beneciaries to face certain types of
risk such as income shocks. This means that the policymaker faces a dilemma since
an optimal transfer schedule explicitly designed for dealing with risky environments
should be as exible as possible. However, if the beneciary has self-control problems,
the role of the policymaker as an insurer may imply important trade-os with its role
as a commitment provider. In fact, if the self-control problem is relatively serious
with respect to the degree of income uncertainty, the value of obtaining information
through income reports is likely to be very low, or even negative if implementing such
a mechanism implies some sort of cost such as administrative and data collection
costs.
Our analysis has several limitations and possible extensions. First, we do not
explicitly consider the possibility of social commitment mechanisms. This type of
16
mechanisms are likely to arise in small communities where individuals are closer to
each other and information is semi-public. In some communities, insurance mecha-
nisms among their members naturally arise. Should we expect the same for social
commitment devices such as peer pressure? Second, there may exist less interven-
tionist commitment technologies. For instance, the policymaker could provide the
beneciary with an illiquid instrument a la Laibson (1997). He could also oer a more
sophisticated mechanism where the beneciary has the option to choose a transfer
schedule from a menu. If he is aware of his self-control problem, the nal consumption
allocation would be the best from a current perspective, and hence ecient. Third,
the second-best results of this paper could be extended to preferences outside the
neighborhood of constant absolute risk aversion. Fourth, it could be assumed that
income shocks are not i.i.d., following instead another type of random process. In
reality, income realizations may not be independent: a bad draw may generate a
series of bad draws. In fact, the analysis of poverty traps in development economics
is based on this type of dynamic mechanism. It would be very interesting to nd out
what the behavior of time inconsistent beneciaries could be in such a scenario as
well as to study the optimal response of the policy maker. Finally, we could introduce
naivete into the model and design an optimal mechanism that takes into account the
possibility of facing a mixture of sophisticated and naive individuals within the target
population.
17
6 Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 3 Let x 2 RT+ be some equilibrium consumption allocation. If there exist
periods j and t, j > t, such that u0(xt ) < 
j tRj tu0(xj), then the allocation is
inecient.
PROOF: First, we will show that there exists " > 0 such that u0(xt ")  
j tRj tu0(xj+
"). Dene the function ﬃ("; ) = u0(xt ") 
j tRj tu0(xj+"). Since u() is concave
and twice dierentiable, we have
ﬃ0("; ) =  u00(xt   ")  R
j tu00(xj + ")
which is strictly positive for all "  0. Since ﬃ("; ) is continuous, there exists some
" > 0 such that ﬃ(0; ) < ﬃ("; )  0. Hence, by concavity of the utility function,
it follows that transferring " to period i strictly increases the welfare of selves t to j
keeping the welfare of selves j+1 to T constant since preferences are strictly monotone
and separable. Next, we claim that the welfare of selves 1 to t   1 strictly increases
by transferring such amount of consumption from period t to period j. By a similar
argument to the one presented above, it suces to show that ﬃ(0; ) < 0 implies that
t ﬁu0(xt )   
j ﬁRj tu0(xj) < 0, or equivalently 
t ﬁﬃ(0; 1) < 0, and that for any
" > 0 satisfying ﬃ("; )  0 we have t ﬁﬃ("; 1)  0, for all ﬁ 2 f1; : : : ; t   1g. This
follows immediately since t ﬁﬃ("; 1)  ﬃ("; ) for all "  0 and  2 (0; 1].
Lemma 4 An allocation x 2 RT+ satisfying
u0(xT 2)  max[Ru
0(xT 1); 
2R2u0(xT )]
cannot be an equilibrium allocation.
PROOF: Dene the set  = f 2 R3 j T 2 = 1; T 1  0; T  0; T 1+ T =  1g,
and the function '(ﬁ) = u(xT 2+ﬁT 2)+
PT
t=T 1 
t T+2u(xt+R
T 2 tﬁt). Taking
the second derivative of the function '() we have
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'00(ﬁ) = u00(xT 2 + ﬁ) + R
22T 1u
00(xT 1 +RT 1ﬁ) + R
32Tu
00(xT +RT ﬁ)
which is clearly strictly negative for all  2 , and, in consequence, strictly concave.
Hence, ﬁ() = argmaxﬁ2R+ '(ﬁ) is a continuous function on  by the Maximum
theorem. Taking the rst derivative of '(ﬁ) and evaluating it at ﬁ = 0, we have
'0(0) = u0(xT 2 + RT 1u
0(xT 1) + R
2Tu
0(xT )
= u0(xT 2 + T 1Ru
0(xT 1) + T
2R2u0(xT )
> u0(xT 2) max[Ru
0(xT 1); 
2R2u0(xT )]
 0
Where the last inequality follows from the initial hypothesis. This shows that the
optimum is strictly positive on : i.e. ﬁ() > 0, for all  2 . Since  is a compact
set, ﬁ() attains its minimum on  by Weierstrass theorem. Let ﬂ = min2 ﬁ(),
and take any ﬁ 2 (0; ﬂ).
Let st(!) be the consumption strategy of self t when cash on hand at that period
is equal to !, and dene T 1 = s

T 1(!T 1   ﬁ)   s

T 1(!T 1). By the argument
above, sT 2(!T 2) + ﬁ is an optimal deviation if (1;
T 1
ﬁ
;
T 1
ﬁ
  1) 2 . In period
T , the agent will consume all resources left. Thus, her equilibrium strategy is given
by sT (!) = !, so all we need to show is that
T 1
ﬁ
2 [0; 1]. In period T-1, there is no
dynamic inconsistency, so the optimal strategy is obtained by solving
sT 1(!) = argmaxu(xT 1) + u(xT )
subject to the constraint xT 1 +R
 1xT = !. First order conditions are given by
u0(sT 1(!)) = Ru
0(!   sT 1(!))
Dierentiating with respect to ! at both sides of the equality, and after some algebraic
manipulations, we obtain
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s0
T 1
(!)
1 s0
T 1
(!)
= u
00(! sT 1(!))
u00(sT 1(!))
Since u() is strictly concave, we must have s0T 1(!) 2 (0; 1). By the Mean Value
Theorem, there exists  2 (!T 1   ﬁ ; !T 1), such that
T 1
ﬁ
= s0()  1. Hence
(1; T 1
ﬁ
;
T 1
ﬁ
  1) 2  and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: The result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 2.3
and 2.4. 
Proof of Lemma 2.1: First, we show that ﬁ = x arises as the equilibrium
allocation. Let s be a Markov perfect equilibrium of the post-transfer game. In order
to prove the result, it suces to show that st (ﬁt) = ﬁt for all t, where ﬁ = x
 2 RT+ is
some ecient allocation. For period T , it is trivially true that this is the best strategy
since player T will consume all resources on hand. Next, assume sj(ﬁj) = ﬁj for all
j > t. I claim that optimal strategy for player t implies st (ﬁt) = ﬁt. Assume, towards
a contradiction, that s(ﬁt) = ﬁt   ", for some " > 0, and let (ﬁt   "; x
0
t+1; : : : ; x
0
T )
be the new consumption allocation from period t to T . Since players t + 1 to T are
playing the strategy sj(ﬁj) = ﬁj by hypothesis, notice that, for any " > 0, all of
them have the option of obtaining a utility of at least Uj(ﬁj; ﬁj+1; : : : ; ﬁT ), and hence
Uj(x
0
j; x
0
j+1; : : : ; x
0
T )  Uj(ﬁj; ﬁj+1; : : : ; ﬁT ), for all j 2 ft; : : : ; Tg, with strict inequality
for player t+ 1 since u() is strictly monotone and !t+1 = ﬁt+1 + ". This implies that
(ﬁ1; : : : ; ﬁt 1; ﬁt "; x
0
t+1; : : : ; x
0
T ) Pareto dominates (ﬁ1; : : : ; ﬁT ), a contradiction. Next,
we show uniqueness. I claim that any ecient allocation x 2 RT+ satises:
u0(xt )  (R)
ﬁu0(xt+ﬁ )
for all t; ﬁ  1. Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exist ﬁ 0 and t0 such that
this condition does not hold. Then
u0(xt0) < (R)
ﬁu0(xt+ﬁ 0)
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This implies that x cannot an ecient allocation since, by concavity of u(), there
exists " > 0 satisfying
u0(xt0   ")  (R)
ﬁu0(xt+ﬁ 0 + ")
Which is clearly a Pareto improvement. Uniqueness follows from Theorem 1 in Laib-
son (1997b).
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Dene V (x) = vt+1(x), and notice that ﬁ
0
i = R(Bt  ﬁi)
and u(ﬁi + yi) =  u(ﬁi)u(yi), i = L;H. Assume, towards a contradiction, that
ﬁ(L) > ﬁ(H). From the incentive compatible constraints we have
u(yH) 
V (ﬁ
0
H
) V (ﬁ
0
L
)
u(ﬁH) u(ﬁL)
and
u(yL) 
V (ﬁ
0
H
) V (ﬁ
0
L
)
u(ﬁH) u(ﬁL)
Hence u(yH)  u(yL), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. It is easier to analyze the problem if we rst dene
some variables. Let  = Ej[ u(yt)], 'L =  u(yL), and 'H =  u(yH). Moreover,
make the following change of variables: instead of having ﬁL and ﬁH as our decision
variables, let the decision variables be uH = u(ﬁH), u
0
H = v(ﬁ
0
H), uL = u(ﬁL) and
u0L = v(ﬁ
0
L). Since an exponential utility function can be decomposed as u(y + x) =
 u(y)u(x) and after some algebraic manipulations, the problem becomes
max ['LuL + u
0
L] + (1  )['HuH + u
0
H ]
s.t.
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'LuL + u
0
L   'LuH   u
0
H  0
uH + u
0
H   'HuL   u
0
L  0
B   V1(uL) R
 1V2(u
0
L)  0
B   V1(uH) R
 1V2(u
0
H)  0
where V1 and V2 are the inverse functions of u() and v(), respectively. The La-
grangean for this problem is given by the function
L = ﬃ(uL; uH ; u
0
Lu
0
H) +
4X
i=1
iﬃi(uL; uH ; u
0
Lu
0
H)
where ﬃ() represents the objective function, while ﬃi corresponds to constraint i,
starting from above. Because u() and v() are concave functions, Vi : R ! R,
i = 1; 2, is convex. Hence, ﬃi, i = 1; : : : ; 4 is concave.
Notice that the objective function is linear, so by the Theorem of Kuhn and
Tucker, u = (uH ; u
0
H ; uL; u
0
L) is a solution to the problem above if and only if there
is  = (1; 

2; 

3; 

4) 2 R
4
+, where 

i is the corresponding multiplier for constraint
i, i = 1; : : : ; 4, such that the following Kunh-Tucker rst order conditions hold:
'L + 1'L   2'H   3V
0
1(uL) = 0 (10)
 + 1   2   3R
 1 1V 02(u
0
L) = 0 (11)
(1  )'H   1'L + 2'H   4V
0
1(uH) = 0 (12)
(1  )  1 + 2   4R
 1 1V 02(u
0
H) = 0 (13)
In a pooling equilibrium the policymaker solves
max
ﬁ
[u(ﬁ + yL) + vt 1(R(B   ﬁ))] + (1  )[u(ﬁ + yH) + vt 1(R(B   ﬁ)]
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After some algebraic manipulations, this problem is equivalent to solve
max
ﬁ
u(ﬁ) + vt 1(R(B   ﬁ))
The solution is implicitly given by u0(ﬁ) = Rv0(ﬁ 0), where ﬁ 0 = R(B   ﬁ). This
implies
 1R 1V
0
2 = 
 1V 01
Given this condition, the Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions for a pooling equilibrium
can be rewritten as follows
'L + 1'L   2'H = v13 (14)
 + 1   2 = 
 1v13 (15)
(1  )'H   1'L + 2'H = v14 (16)
(1  )  1 + 2 = 
 1v14 (17)
From equations 14)-16) or 17)-18) we have:
2 =
(  'L)
   'H
+
   'L
   'H
1 (18)
From where it can be concluded that necessary and sucient conditions for having
positive 1 and 2 multipliers are
'L >  (19)
1 
(  'L)
'L   
(20)
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Positive 3 and 4 are obtained if and only if the following conditions are satised
'L + 1'L   2'H  0 (21)
 + 1   2  0 (22)
(1  )'H   1'L + 2'H  0 (23)
(1  )  1 + 2  0 (24)
equivalently
2 
'L
'H
+
'L
'H
1 (25)
2 


+ 1 (26)
2   (1  ) +
'L
'H
1 (27)
2   
1  

+ 1 (28)
Condition (25) implies condition (26). Therefore, expressions 18)-20), 25), and
27)-28) together provide a set of necessary and sucient parametric restrictions for
a pooling equilibrium to exist.
Conditions 18) and 25) imply:
1 
'L   'H
('H   'L)
(29)
which is trivially satised for any 1  0. Conditions 18) and 27)-28) are satised if
and only if:
1  (1  )
'H
'H   'L
1  

(30)
Therefore, all of these conditions above are satised if and only if
(1  )
'H
'H   'L
1  


(  'L)
'L   
(31)
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and condition (19) are satised.
Dene the function
ﬃ() =
1  

('L   )
Condition (31) can be rewritten as follows
ﬃ() 

1  
'H   'L
'H
(  'L) (32)
Dene by  the value of  that makes equation (31) hold with equality. After
some manipulations, we have  = 'L
'H
. Since ﬃ() is strictly decreasing in the set
[0; 'L

), and  < 'L

, we have that condition (32) is satised if and only if   .
This completes the proof.
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